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Abstract: 
The risk of external interventions crowding-out intrinsic motivation has long been 
established in economics. This paper introduces a new dimension by arguing that a 
crowding-out effect does become possible if individuals receive higher relative 
compensation. Using a unique, large data set that focuses on 26 seasons in 
basketball (NBA) we find empirical support for a relative crowding-out effect. 
Performance is reduced as a reaction to a relative income advantage. 
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That external interventions may under some conditions crowd-out intrinsic motivation has long been well 
established in economics. It represents a particularly important “anomaly” to standard economics because it 
proposes an effect working in the opposite direction to the fundamental relative price effect: When monetary 
compensation is increased performance decreases (rather than increases)  if the crowding-out effect proves 
stronger than the relative price effect. The crowding-out effect is of obvious importance for compensation policy. 
 
  The existence of a crowding-effect has been proposed early on by Titmuss (1970). It has 
been given a perception and/or signalling interpretation (see Akerlof and Kranton 2008, Bénabou 
and Tirole 2003, Frey 1997, Prendergast 2008). A large number of experimental trials and field 
experiments that relate to economics have been performed (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer 1997, 
Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a,b; for a survey see Frey and Jegen 2001). 
 
This paper introduces a new dimension to this motivational effect. It is argued, and empirically tested, that 
there also exists the possibility of a crowding-out effect when individuals receive higher relative compensation. 
The importance of relative income has been highlighted by Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949) and Frank (1985). 
Several models have been developed analysing that individuals seek to maximize well-defined preferences 
depending on the consumption or income of others (see Bolton 1991, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and 
Rabin 2002, Fehr and Schmidt 1999 and Sobel 2005 for an overview). Research on happiness using survey data 
(e.g. Clark and Oswald 1996, Easterlin 2001, Frey 2008, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Layard 2005) also finds strong 
empirical support for the importance of relative income. 
    According to the relative crowding-out effect an individual’s intrinsic motivation to perform is 
undermined when relative income position improves. Relative income gain may be interpreted as a signal of that 
their position compared to others is considered to be of overriding importance by their employers, and/or that they 




Empirical studies of the effects of income differences on individual behavior have been hindered 
by the lack of data on individual performance and the lack of publicly available income data. In 
contrast, in basketball, individual and team performance is well defined and can be readily 
observed. There is a growing literature successfully demonstrating the advantages of working 
with sports data (see, e.g., Goff and Tollison 1990, Rosen and Sanderson 2001, or Szymanski 
2003). This paper uses a unique data set of professional basketball, the National (American) 
Basketball Association (NBA) over 26 seasons between 1979 and 2006. The data includes not 
only the contract salary but also additional salary components such as bonuses. A composite 
index for the individual performance of a basketball player relies on the basic idea to add all the 
“good things” that a player can do such as points scored (PTS), total rebounds (TREB), steals 
(STL), blocks (BLK), and assists (AST) and then subtract the “bad things”, namely turnovers (TO), 
field goals missed (FGMS) and free throws missed (FTMS). This performance index is divided by 
the number of games played. 
 
PERFBasketball =  GP
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3. Empirical Models 
Investigating the pay-for-performance relationship requires a model that takes the incentive effects of absolute 
and relative pay into account. Doing so, our model captures whether a player’s current performance is affected by 
his future pay assuming that player’s current performance is not affect by the amount of money he or she has 
already been paid. Instead, a major factor influencing current performance is future pay. Individuals’ 
performances are motivated by what they expect to receive in the future. As data on individuals’ perceptions are 
not available we assume that the best available proxy for individuals’ perceptions is actual future pay. Thus, our 
specification has the following structure: 
 
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 RELADVi(t+1) +β3 RELDISADVi(t+1) + β4 ABSALi(t+1) 
     +TEAMDi +TDt + Ii + εit,,    
      
where PERFit is the performance of player i at time t. ABSALi(t+1)  is the future salary of a player and RELADVi  




j i S S
N 1
1
, where  . i j S S <  On the other hand, RELDISADVi 




i j S S
N 1
1
, where i j S > S , with  i S = individual salary. In 
addition,   j S  is the salary of the reference group members (teammates). Moreover, we have included team 
dummy variables (TEAMDi), as it can be argued that the results are driven by unobserved team characteristics that 
are correlated with income and performance. Team fixed effects allow us to control for such possible omitted 
variable bias. We also consider time dummies (TDt) to control for possible differences in the players’ 
environment. Finally, Ii is the individual effect of player i, and εit denotes the error term. We control therewith for 
ability since player fixed effects account for any omitted variables (player characteristics) that do not change over 
time. 
  A model using future pay assumes that a player is able to predict his and other players’ future income 
situation, and therefore his relative income position. However, individuals may have difficulties predicting their 
future utility and tastes (for an overview, see, for example, Loewenstein, Donoghue and Rabin 2003). The 
robustness of the results is therefore checked using present rather than future earnings as a reference point. The 
second specification is: 
 
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 RELADVit +β3 RELDISADVit+ β4 ABSALit 











Table 1 presents the estimation results. 
 
TABLE 1 about here 
 
 
The estimates reveal the relative importance of the variables used. To obtain robust standard errors in these 
estimations, the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of standard errors is used. The table also shows the results 
when standard errors by players are clustered to pick up any player-specific characteristics that change over time. 
Considering the twenty-six basketball seasons, players’ ability can be taken to have a fixed and a variable portion.  
The results suggest that relative income position (above and below the average) have a 
statistically significantly negative effect on performance. In contrast, the coefficients for absolute 
income are statistically significantly positive throughout. Players care about the salary distribution 
within the team (reference group) and not just about their own salary. The results indicate the 
tendency of a stronger performance decrease for players having a relative income advantage 
controlling for the absolute income. This finding is consistent with the relative crowding-out 
effect. Having a relative income advantage may affect performance in a negative way reducing 
the intrinsic motivation to perform. Thus, our findings complement this literature by noting that a 




This paper presents novel empirical evidence that social comparisons matter in competitive 
environments such as sports markets. Our unique large data set that focuses on 26 seasons in 
basketball explores athletes’ pay and performance relationship in a controlled environment.  
  We find support for a relative crowding-out effect. Performance is reduced as a reaction to 
a relative income advantage, while absolute incentives affect performance positively. Thus our 
regression results support theories of personal motivation, stressing the relevance of a 
performance crowding-out effect at the upper income level. Previous studies are complemented, 
by showing that such a crowding-out effect may refer to the relative, and not only to the absolute 
income level.  
Using data from professional sports has, of course, its limitations. Average salaries paid in 
professional basketball are higher than in most other occupations. Moreover, our results may not 
necessarily be transferred to situations in which pay and performance are less visible or less 
easily measured. Nevertheless, the results may be relevant for employees in corporations as they 
often work in teams, that are to some extent similar to sports teams. Lessons can be learned for 
the design of incentive and reward mechanisms. The results are also relevant in areas where 
relative income and rank ordering are of special importance such as in consulting, law 
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Table 1: Crowding-Out Effect  




Present  Model 
 
   OLS  CLUST  FE  OLS  CLUST  FE 
SALARY                 
  RELATIVE SALARY 
ABOVE  -.361*** -.909*** -.593*** -.289***  -.832***  -.0557 
    (-5.61)  (-4.34)  (-4.67)  (-5.13)  (-3.83)  (-0.46) 
  RELATIVE SALARY 
BELOW  -.122*** -.663*** -.336*** -.194***  -1.05***  -.432*** 
    (-6.80)  (-5.39)  (-3.95)  (-10.12)  (-7.48)  (-5.26) 
  ABSOLUTE SALARY  .947***  1.83***  .689***  .77***  1.67***  .124 
    (13.28) (10.24) (6.06)  (11.64)  (8.70)  (1.13) 
                  
PLAYER’S CHARACTER                 
  AGE  .234  .38  3.99***  .399***  .641**  4.4*** 
    (1.93) (1.40) (20.10)  (3.88)  (2.71)  (25.59) 
  AGE SQUARE  -.247*  -.00722  -.0798***  -.483***  -.0138***  -.0844*** 
    (-2.06) (-1.50) (-24.38)  (-4.77)  (-3.32)  (-33.32) 
TEAM  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
SEASON  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
PLAYER  No No Yes No  No  Yes 
F-Test  joint  significance  960.02*** 448.56*** 49.08***  976.21***  430.00***  27.38*** 
(REL. & ABOLUTE INC.)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R-Squared  0.384 0.384 0.288 0.330  0.330  0.322 
F  64.13*** 38.13*** 30.73*** 64.65*** 36.74*** 48.92*** 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Groups (Players)     1161  1161     1512  1512 
Number  of  Observations  5470 5470 5470 7656  7656  7656 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
 a beta or standardized regression coefficients.  
 